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ABSTRACT 
 This article addresses the subject of stand-up and mental health through the 
prism of comic persona, generating new, non-diagnostic discourses around mental 
illness. The article focuses on British and Australian comedians whose material 
addresses conditions such as bipolar disorder (John Scott), depression and anxiety 
(Seymour Mace; Lauren Pattison; Felicity Ward), or feigns the staging of mental 
collapse (Stewart Lee).  Based on the analysis of live events and one-on-one 
interviews, the essay considers the role that persona plays in mediating the 
relationship between the comedian and their material, arguing that shaping 
persona is key to developing practices framed within a poetics of vulnerability. 
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INTRODUCING PERSONA, STAND-UP, AND MENTAL HEALTH 
One of the first tasks of the stand-up comedian on their stage entrance is to amplify their voice, 
usually by means of a microphone.  At the same time, they must attempt something more 
complex but no less vital: to amplify their subjectivity by means of persona.  My use of persona 
references Erving Goffman’s definition:  the “implicit or explicit claim” that a social being makes 
“to be a person of a particular kind” (1959, p. 24); in this case a distilled, or exaggerated, essence 
of themselves, embodied on stage, which becomes the vehicle for their comedy. Several authors 
(Brodie; Double; Frances-White & Shandur; Ince; Quirk) have stressed the importance of 
persona in comedy, between them providing the basis for a critical framework. First, the comic’s 
persona must be highly subjective and quickly signal their unique perspective on the world. 
This becomes particularly apparent in club nights featuring four or five comedians. In a short 
time, the stand-up must convince the audience of who they are, a process which is mirrored in 
Chris Rock’s joke: “When you meet somebody  for the first time, you’re not meeting them, you’re 
meeting their representative” (Rock 1999).i Secondly, subjectivity must be maintained 
consistently:  most comics will not move from surreal flights of fancy to politcal gags, or from 
physical clowning to confessional depth, unless they address this tonal shift as an integral part 
of their act. As Robin Ince explains, “An audience need to know what they believe they are 
dealing with – the universe they occupy must be defined“ (2018a, p. 126). For Ince, the 
authenticity of who he is on-stage would be undermined if he could not meet people ‘as himself’ 
off-stage after the performance (2018b).ii Thirdly, the persona of many stand-ups will convey 
not just a specific point of view but a socially marginal one. As folklorist Ian Brodie points out, 
“marginalisation is a subjective framework created by the performer in collusion with the 
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audience“ (2014, p. 104). One of the ways a marginalised framework might be created is when a 
comedian openly declares mental distress, which is itself the playing out of a stigmatised social 
identity.  
The symbiotic relationship between comedy and mental health is an open secret that, 
until recently, few have considered more than common fact.  The ‘tears of a clown’ and/or 
suicidal comedian are cultural clichés and can be summarised in the Groucho Marx joke:  A man 
goes to an analyst and says he has lost the will to live. The doctor says, “Why not go to the circus 
to see Grock, the world’s funniest clown. I’m sure you will be much happier”. The man says, “I 
am Grock” (qtd in Kanfer 2001 p. 432).  It is a cultural trope that the desire to perform stand-up 
comedy is itself evidence of a mental health problem. Judd Apatow’s book of conversations with 
fellow comedians, for example, is called Sick in the Head (2015).  “When someone is laughing”, 
Apatow explains, “I know they don’t dislike me … I … need … constant approval” (qtd in Maron 
& McDonald 2017, p. 237).iii The point is reinforced by the late Robin Williams: 
How desperately insecure we are that made us do this for a living … you get to do stuff, 
where if you did it in the street people go: ‘That man! He talked about his penis! To me 
openly!’ And you do it in a club, suddenly there’s this license to thrill … You’re this weird 
insecure guy who does this looking, like Lenny Bruce said, looking for love. Do you love 
me? Temporarily? Kind of?  I don’t care if you love me, I gotta say this shit. Is that an artist 
or is that a sociopath? Or a psychopath? … Well I’m not going to label him! (Maron 2010)  
Williams’ positioning of himself as outsider is part of what Brodie means by “the vernacular 
theory of comedy” which views the comedian as a social type differentiated as “marginalized … 
rooted in loneliness and the need for approval … seeing the world from a different perspective” 
(2014, p. 104). The sense that there is something ‘wrong’ with comedians has led to medical 
studies that seek to uncover apparent psychotic traits:  psychological profiling via online tests 
indicate that “perception aberration” (paranormal or magical thinking); “cognitive 
disorganisation”; “anhedonia” (inability to feel pleasurable emotions); and impulsive risk taking 
are all disproportionately found to be traits of stand-ups (Ando et al. 2014).iv 
In this essay, I address the under-researched issue of comedy and mental health through 
the prism of comic persona. I do not diagnose comedians, rather I seek to analyse the vivid 
contribution that stand-ups make to understanding vulnerable states of mind. I focus on British 
and Australian comedians whose material addresses conditions such as bipolar disorder (John 
Scott), depression and anxiety (Seymour Mace; Lauren Pattison; Felicity Ward), or feigns the 
staging of mental collapse (Stewart Lee). Based on analysis of live events and one-on-one 
interviews, I consider the role that persona plays in mediating the relationship between 
comedian and material or between comedian and audience. I suggest that there are at least five 
ways that persona operates in this context: as a protective device which allows the performer to 
share vulnerabilities (Scott); as an interruption of an established identity which allows the 
voicing of revelations (Pattison); as a theatrical conceit which troubles the notion of fixed 
identity (Lee); as an emotional distancing effect (Ward); and as a way of articulating a sense of 
belonging (Mace). I am not suggesting that such persona transactions are purely technical 
devices that can be picked off the shelf by the next aspiring comedian: they are deeply 
embedded in each individual and work in specific ways. Nor do I intend to be patronising or 
reductive about a complex performance dynamic.  I argue that by describing and analysing the 
affect of persona, it is possible to understand the importance and subtlety of self-presentation as 
one component in conveying complex subject matter. The analysis of stand-up and persona, I 
assert, can make an original and important contribution to the fields of persona studies and to 
the emerging field of performance and mental health. Such analysis dismantles reductive 
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binaries (well/sick; sane/insane; happy/suffering) and leads to more productive ways of 
thinking: not to administer or medicate, but to illuminate the subjective experience of 
stigmatised states of being. ‘Mental health’, in so far as it means anything, is the capacity to 
develop - and cope with having - a self. ‘Mental health’ is embedded in the craft of stand-up since 
the form places high demands on the individual practitioner’s ability to negotiate this self 
aesthetically and publicly.   
My essay is underpinned by the philosophical work of Erinn Gilson, who argues that 
vulnerability is an increasingly urgent issue in the neoliberal era, in which the prevailing mode 
of selfhood is ‘entrepreneurial subjectivity’ that promotes competitive self-seeking as the only 
rational choice. Gilson’s Ethics of Vulnerability (2014) explores the implications of three 
assertions: first, that the normative equivalence of vulnerability with weakness devalues 
vulnerability as something socially ‘bad’; second, that vulnerability can be viewed as an ethical 
resource that helps manifest virtues of empathy and compassion; and third, that vulnerability is 
often wrongly reduced to a state of perpetual risk, as opposed to an ambiguous, multifaceted, 
and productive experience, full of human potential. I argue that stand-up, as an artistic and 
social platform, provides a unique place to observe vulnerability at work and offers a critique of 
the entrepreneurial self. Like Gilson, I question why vulnerability is overwhelmingly equated 
with socially undesirable indicators such as weakness and risk. I argue that vulnerability is an 
aesthetic and social resource to be explored and celebrated. I take this theme forward here, 
echoing comedian Phil Jupitus:  
I’ve always had this belief that you have to have something wrong with you to want to do 
stand-up, because it is putting yourself (particularly as a performer) in possibly the most 
vulnerable position you can be in, aside from people who fuck each other in Amsterdam 
for money … I think it’s really baring and putting yourself out there. (qtd in Double 2013, 
p. 129) 
The craft of stand-up involves a dual decision: not only the choice to put your ‘self’ out there but 
also which ‘self’ to send as representative.    
PERSONA AS SHIELD: JOHN SCOTT’S CREATIVE RECOVERY 
The first category of comic persona is that of protective shield: a mode of address which allows 
the comic to choose those parts of him- or herself that they will allow public scrutiny.   It 
permits the voicing of vulnerabilities that would otherwise be too painful to share. Scottish 
comedian John Scott has, in his own words, had “nineteen years’ experience as a comedian and 
twenty-four years’ experience as a mental health service user”.  Furthermore, he says: “I don't 
think comedians statistically experience mental health issues any more than the general public 
at large. It's just that you hear them talk about it” (Scott 2019). Scott points out in his 2017 show 
Delusions that the relationship between his psychiatric self and his comic self has always 
privately, if rarely publicly, intertwined: 
The unusual thing about me I suppose is it was actually becoming a comedian that got the 
right diagnosis. When I started out in comedy I was without treatment. A doctor took 
sympathy on me and also doubted my diagnosis so we had a wee experiment with going 
meds free. So after six weeks I went back to see the doctor. How are you doing meds free? 
she asked. AWESOME I said, I’VE BECOME A COMEDIAN. She went, Oh no … I was worried 
about something like this happening … At one point I visited the local GP because my 
condition was acting up, and he didn’t believe I was a comedian. He actually thought I was 
being delusional again. You might be thinking the same. (Scott 2017) 
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Delusions was the first time Scott had ‘come out’ as having a history of acute mental health 
difficulties. Utilising a punchline-rich political satire, the show presents his own struggle with 
bipolar disorder in conjunction with, and possibly as a manifestation of, the current world-
political order. Scott deploys the constant interruptive dissonance between his own narrative 
journey through the mental health system and wider geo-political chaos. The show is a 
narrative of how he was misdiagnosed with schizophrenia as a young man and the difficult 
process of having this diagnosis overturned to bipolar disorder, for which he now, by his own 
admission, receives successful treatment. The show Delusions is both memoir and educative 
tool. Scott’s message is one of creative recovery: 
There’s been a lot said about anxiety and depression but this show looks at the more 
acute end of mental health and is about the period in my life when I was misdiagnosed 
with schizophrenia. Don’t worry I got better … but I wouldn’t want to catch it again. (Scott 
2017) 
Scott’s on-stage persona is not far from his everyday self: affable, good humoured, sharing 
of enthusiasms. The lines above, early in the show, demonstrate how far he is at pains to put the 
audience at ease, to acknowledge the potential for discomfort and to gently put it to rest. As he 
said in interview: 
I’ve never exposed myself like this as a comedian. I felt very vulnerable doing this, now I 
feel empowered by it. Vulnerability in stand-up comedy is really when you’re talking 
about very personal material. It’s not just whether they are going to laugh at this, it’s how 
they are going to take me as a person because of this … It’s probably the most out of my 
comfort zone space I’ve ever been as a comedian … Rather than saying ‘I’m weak, I’m 
vulnerable’ I’m using the defence of laughter as a barricade, as a shield, but that is my job 
as a stand-up. (Scott 2019) 
Perhaps the most affecting moments in his routine, and some of the funniest, are when Scott 
tells how others around him were implicated in the diagnostic journey from schizophrenia to 
bipolar.  After an involved description of the events leading to the over-turning of his first 
diagnosis, his then girlfriend is consistently referenced as a supportive other: “I should also 
mention I no longer have that girlfriend in these stories any more … Now she’s my wife” (Scott 
2017). As Scott explained: 
My wife is pivotal [in the show]: helping me get the treatment. When I first spoke of this 
and I talked about her - it hit me - I became very emotional how hard it had been for both 
of us. So I checked myself and tried to write in a way that wouldn’t make me emotional. I 
was very conscious. I could have made it more sentimental but I wanted to keep it to just 
for laugh. I don’t want people getting weepy. (Scott 2019) 
This is an important principle of what I refer to as a poetics of vulnerability: that 
vulnerability avows structural support. I argue that Scott’s work, like others discussed here, 
extends Gilson’s idea of vulnerability as a productive human state: it is an aesthetic - and 
comedic - resource, which has not thus far been properly understood. Delusions upsets the 
notion of the self as autonomous entity: Scott’s journey is an implicit critique of the ideology of 
what Gilson terms ‘entrepreneurial subjectivity’, the now prevalent mode of citizenship which 
promotes competitive self-seeking. What comes across clearly in his material is the care and 
attention of a range of psychiatrists and a loving partner who supported Scott to attain his 
current equilibrium. Delusions then, despite being a solo performance, to borrow from Shannon 
Jackson, “foregrounds performance as a series of supporting relations” (2011, p. 42). This is 
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echoed in two iterations of the performance I have seen where Scott openly refers to written 
material on the stage floor. He makes no secret that this work is ‘supported’ by written material 
and occasionally allows us to see the written mechanism that comics often keep hidden.   
Scott’s psychiatric condition, bipolar disorder, is, one might argue, already personified. 
Psychoanalyst Darian Leader states that bipolar disorder often involves the “creation of a new 
persona, as if one were someone else” (2013, p. 15), which he associates with the role of “the 
night club entertainer who has to keep his audience focused on himself at all times” (2013, p. 
25). Is it “any accident”, Leader asks, “that manic depression is so common in the world of 
comedians?” (2013, p. 25). For Leader, the ‘signature motifs’ of bipolar, during high periods, 
correlate with stand-up: the flight of ideas; the sense of a special connectedness between things; 
compulsions and increased appetites; a tendency to create categorical distinctions between 
good and bad; and the need for an audience. Such correlations have been questioned by 
comedian Sarah Pascoe:  
It is tempting to say "YES, that is what comedians are like, we are not normal, we are so 
special and creative, QUICKLY put us in the attic and get remarried!" But we're not that 
interesting. Very little of what we do is inspired. We work hard on sculpting our routines. 
Through nightly practice. What remains in a set and what gets cut is mostly decided by 
the audience, whose reactions are essential within the creative process. Are they 
psychotic too? (Pascoe 2014) 
These comments reflect what psychoanalyst Adam Phillips views as the problem of both 
undervaluing so-called mental illness – disciplining it through normative rules – and over-
valuing it – idealising or romanticising those who have ‘it’ and convey some essential truth 
(Phillips 2012, p. 197). I do not want to reinforce a binary opposition between ‘the nightly 
grafter’ and the ‘gifted psychotic’. I simply suggest that there is a formal synergy between the art 
of stand-up and the clinical label of bipolar, as it is defined by Leader. Both ‘forms’ share a 
hyper-connectivity; a propensity for word-play and punning; and the need to keep the language 
flowing: “Manic discourse freezes the listener; speaking keeps the other person there ... The 
listener will often feel manipulated or controlled” (Leader 2013, p. 25). Stand-up is manic 
speech formalised: the underlying rule that makes stand-up work is that what appears to be 
dialogue is always one with a silent interlocutor. As comedian Dylan Moran observes: “It's like 
you’re having a conversation with the other person, but you’re having to work it out for both of 
you” (Maron 2012). Any disturbance in this formal contract, heckling for example, is an 
exception that proves the rule: it is disruption that must be suppressed to make way for 
continued monologue. 
PERSONA INTERRUPTED:  LAUREN PATTISON’S “SHIT TONNE OF LAYERS” 
The second category of persona in relationship to comedy and mental health I refer to as 
‘interruptive’ because it splits and refocuses an established persona in order to voice another 
more layered truth. Perhaps the most shocking example - and at the time of writing, most 
influential in the comedy industry - is the Australian comedian Hannah Gadsby’s 2017 work 
Nanette, which broke with her habitual persona and has become a touchstone for a re-
examination not just of mental health but of the formal conventions of stand-up. These, Gadsby 
argues, perpetuate harmful tropes of self-degradation and gender violence and make audience 
and performer complicit in the diminishment of personal suffering through self-deprecation. 
Mary Luckhurst’s detailed essay on Gadsby in this issue can be read both in its own right and as 
a kind of parallax to this analysis. A comedienne at an earlier point in her career is Newcastle-
born Lauren Pattison, who has enjoyed rapid success over the last two years, with shows Lady 
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Muck and Peachy. Pattison’s comic persona plays with her identity as a young woman, recently 
graduated, who finds herself in a world which jars with her working-class roots. She references 
her appearance as ‘cute’ like a baby or a kitten; is self-deprecating about her ability to find 
suitable relationships; and much of her comedy derives from her class position as the underdog 
in most relationship and social situations. This persona works itself through the two shows: the 
first is a break-up narrative, the second a redemption tale of new love and new adventures, 
touring comedy in Australia. Pattison’s child-adult status is consistently deployed through 
references to her mum, and the sense that Lauren is vulnerable and in need of being looked 
after. Pattison willingly delves into the underlying anxieties which underpin her success. Two 
thirds into Peachy, Pattison moves seamlessly into the following monologue, which occurs after 
her new boyfriend has bought her a gift, which demonstrates how much he has listened to her, 
not something she is used to: 
I find it quite hard to get people to listen. If I want to get people to listen to me I have to 
charge you £10, put on some sequins and scream into a microphone [big laugh] that’s how 
I do it [as laughter fades] ... ‘Comedy Lauren’, everyone cares what Comedy Lauren’s got to 
say. ‘Normal Lauren’: nobody gives a fuck. No one gives a shit. I can put a joke on 
Facebook and it’ll get few hundred likes ‘cause I’m fucking hilarious. I can ask for someone 
to go for a coffee with me and no one will reply.  No one gives a shit about the real me. 
Everyone just cares about that version of me: the on-stage me, the comedy one, that’s who 
people want to know, and I can’t be that person all the time. I’m not that person all the 
time. So this was the first time that someone cared about me, Normal Lauren, who puts on 
a shit tonne of layers, just to make someone laugh. That’s who someone cared about. 
(Pattison 2018) 
When I saw this show live, the immediate impact of these words was incredibly powerful. It was 
as if someone was literally taking off the mask she had maintained up to this point and trying on 
another.  
Pattison’s reference to the “shit tonne of layers” is a call back to an earlier routine where 
she literally dresses herself in an absurd number of clothing layers, awaiting her boyfriend’s 
arrival. Yet, it also echoes the psychological layering happening in the moment: that what we see 
on stage is a layered, constructed persona. Perhaps the correlation between the sartorial and 
the psychological is accidental but Pattison’s work is so carefully written and constructed that 
this seems unlikely. In its way, it is a direct challenge to the audience, as if she is saying: I’m not 
just a clown, I’m not just what you can see, I’m a whole other person besides this. This on-stage 
revelation echoes John Limon’s central thesis that stand-up’s true subject is always abjection: 
abjection as an abasement and a prostration before the audience; but also abjection as a way to 
describe “something miring your life, some skin that cannot be sloughed off, some role … that 
has become your only character” (2000, p. 4). Perhaps in this case not the only character, but a 
character that has suddenly given Pattison a degree of fame and hard-won recognition that 
would be difficult to give up. It is as if Pattison, like Batman’s enemy, Bane, has found a true 
purpose through a mask. As Bane in The Dark Knight Rises says of his position: “No one cared 
who I was till I put on the mask” (Nolan & Nolan, p.3)Bane’s survival, and perhaps that of some 
comedians, is dependent on the putting on of a persona.  
Pattison’s work also underlines Alain Ehrenberg’s thesis that “depression … serves as a 
canvas upon which to sketch out the changes in modern subjectivity, the displacement of the 
hard task of being healthy” (2016, p. 232). Ehrenberg asserts that depression is an endemic 
contemporary phenomenon, one which reflects the weariness of the postmodern subject, who 
must undertake the daily labour of self-definition. I argue that stand-up is a particular kind of 
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self-definitional labour, one that reflects - via persona - what it means to live in a world of 
perpetual, self-monitoring choices. Pattison, in Peachy, has achieved the success she desired and 
been given new choices: international travel, awards, independence. Yet this choice, this 
sovereignty of the individual, as Ehrenberg terms it, leads to insecurity and the inability to act. 
Depression is the opposite of the desired social norm: future-orientated, goal-driven, 
autonomous, proactive, and invulnerable. Pattison, in her portrait of the artist as a young 
depressive, offers, like several other comics analysed here, a counter-discourse, one that gives 
voice to depressive subjectivity. This subjectivity is, as Nietzsche once asserted, a complaint: 
“There is one small dose of revenge in every complaint”, he said, which “can give life spice and 
make it endurable” (qtd in Ehrenberg 2016, p. xiii). There is an anger in Pattison’s words at this 
point in the show, a reproach, not just to the world at large but to the audience. It is this act of 
anger that seeks to make the most direct connection. Yet it also hints at the fleeting nature of 
this connection. It is a statement of rage at one human being’s incapacity to connect beyond the 
level of the joke.  
PERSONA AS THEATRICAL CONCEIT: STEWART LEE AND THE GHOSTS OF DEAD 
COMEDIANS 
Stewart Lee, who has increasingly had to reinvent his marginalisation because of his 
commercial success, is an example of the use of persona as theatrical conceit which troubles the 
notion of a fixed or authentic identity. Deploying a faux-arrogant persona, aggrandising mania 
coupled with despair, Lee has defined his creative process in part thus: 
Like a lot of stand-ups I try to write in the rhythm and cadences of someone who has 
cornered you in a bar or a train carriage, continues drinking steadily and determinedly 
over a two hour period, grows increasingly agitated and unhappy whilst holding forth on 
a series of subjects he really knows little about; and in so doing, inadvertently reveals 
some great truth and/or the real things that are driving him to despair. (Lee 2013)  
Lee is underlining an important issue: that comic persona is constructed, intimate and 
vernacular, and often implies deep-rooted distress. If ‘agitation’, ‘despair’, and ‘unhappiness’, 
not to mention alcohol and other self-cures, are often part of the dramaturgy of stand-up per se, 
might this not make stand-up a form a priori equipped to explore mental distress? Some readers 
may find the inclusion of Lee in this discussion surprising. I am, for the most part, analysing the 
work of stand-ups who declare a clinically specific mental health issue. Lee does not. But some 
of his routines have led certain audience members and critics to believe that he has:   
I was in Dublin and I did a long bit about thinking I’m being haunted by the ghosts of 
comedians who have killed themselves. It goes on for ages and people buy into it. I’ve had 
people in the front row going, “Can you see them? Are they around you?” Anyway, a 
woman in the front row got her camera out and took a photo. So I went, “Why would you 
do that? Why would you take a photo of someone remembering people they know who 
have taken their own lives?” Then she crept out …. she’s a journalist … and she’s tweeted: 
“I’ve just seen Stewart Lee have a mental breakdown on stage thinking that ghosts are 
attacking him.” She bought into it to the point where she thought she’d got a scoop that I’d 
gone nuts. (Lee 2013) 
The routine which, which eventually appeared in Stewart Lee’s Comedy Vehicle (BBC 2016), 
reminds me of Frankie Howard’s joke: “The most important thing in show business is you’ve got 
to be authentic. And if you can fake that, you’ve got it made” (qtd in Ince 2014). Lee’s authentic 
conceit is precisely that: fake. He presents the trope of the wounded clown recovering from 
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childhood trauma (a bullying incident where other boys urinate on him); berates his audience 
for laughing in all the wrong places (saying “Audiences like you as good as murdered Robin 
Williams”); and then pretends to hear voices and see the bodies of dead comedians on stage in a 
painful pseudo-collapse. Part of my research process has involved practising stand-up as a 
creative intervention with people who identity as mental health service users, which has 
involved watching recordings of some of the comedians discussed here with members of Recoco 
Recovery College, Newcastle -Upon-Tyne. Responses to Lee’s recorded work were mixed. One 
person asked: “How does he get an audience for that?” (Seminar 2019b). Another praised the 
way Lee was able to weave different elements together over the course of the half hour so that if 
you missed one bit, you would miss the whole point. Another found it offensive and walked out, 
stating: “That is totally disgusting. I’ve heard voices. You can’t take the piss out of that” (ibid). 
Another stated “I laugh at my voices like he does. You’ve got to laugh about it” (ibid). 
Furthermore, we discussed the possibility that Lee was doing the equivalent of blacking up: 
‘madding up’.  If so, who had the authority to claim ownership of madness? To exercise its 
limits?   
Stand-up troubles the relationship between public statement and truth: in the field of 
medicalised mental health, which has become ever more obsessed with the ‘objective’ truth of 
diagnosis, stand-up can convey the limits of such objectivity. Lee’s deployment of persona 
dismantles any simple, unambiguous model combining stand-up and mental health. I argue that 
the utility of stand-up - in deconstructing stigma for example - is not limited to the ‘honest’ or 
‘authentic’ confession of mental health labels. The complex interplay of public utterance, joke, 
truth, persona, and audience-performer relationship creates a space in which all fixed labels, 
especially those of psychological instability (which cause some people to be described sane and 
others mad) seem to disappear for the life of the performance. It is by understanding how each 
comic manages the relationship between truth, persona, and so- called illness that stand-up 
might offer new ways of thinking about the lived experience of mental health. In Lee’s case, the 
line between art and psychosis is intentionally blurred when he discusses the distance between 
himself and his stage persona:  
I remember being on stage in Liverpool, and a terrible thing had happened in Liverpool 
that week and I was thinking how awful it would be to accidentally mention that and I 
found myself up above myself looking down on myself and I was saying all these things 
and I was trying to stop me from doing it and I realised that it wasn’t happening, that I 
wasn’t saying those things and I became this other personality and I lost time. I don’t 
know what I was doing in that time, I had a kind of panic that this other voice had got the 
better of me. But now I use that. I sort of let it … let it do things, and I think I can normally 
get it back before it’s ruined everything. It might be from having been in the double act, 
with Rich Herring, where that was sort of my function, was to, um, bait him into going too 
far and then I would get the thing back on track. But now I do that to myself. (Hagen 2019) 
This is an example of where a sort of fugue or panic state has inspired a later creative choice. It 
is interesting to note that Lee evokes the earlier double act as a potential reason for this voice 
hearing, as if he is channelling his one-time stage partner, even as a solo act. If the seeing of dead 
people on stage is fictional, drawing as much on Victorian medium shows as stand-up 
(Luckhurst 2014), even more ambiguous is the mental mechanics of a live stand-up working 
out, in the moment, what he can or should get away with. It is possible that this aesthetic choice 
was born of a previous necessity: an overcoming of an earlier on-stage trauma in which he 
genuinely lost control. Lee often seeks to ‘lose the room’ in his longer sets; there is a built-in 
dynamic of failure in his work where he is consciously trying to make it appear as if the act has 
Persona Studies 2019, vol. 5, no. 2  
 
75 
 
lost its way. Lee claims that this is because he wants his act to be liked (or respected) in spite of 
his on-stage persona, not because it is charming the audience (Lee 2010).  
PERSONA AS DISTANCING EFFECT: FELICITY WARD’S EXUBERANT DEPRESSION 
Australian-born comic Felicity Ward represents a fourth potential category for understanding 
persona: as an emotional distancing device. Ward describes her on-stage persona as:  
Quite joyful. I do find it very pleasurable being on stage. I also think that that’s very un-
British. It’s not a very common persona over here [in the UK] to be exuberant on stage. It 
also depends on confidence. If I’m confident I can get away with being really cheeky or 
really dark and because the audience feel safe, they know that they’re going to come out of 
it … I’m not a sit-back-on-my-heels, cynical, you’ll-come-to-me, kind of comic. I’m very 
open-hearted. (Ward 2019) 
This ‘open-heartedness’ has led one reviewer to refer to Ward’s comedy as “highly strung and 
needy” (Logan 2015). Logan’s review of Ward’s 2015 Edinburgh festival show What If There is 
No Toilet? -  a narrative of anxiety, depression and irritable bowel syndrome; and of recovery 
from recurrent on-stage panic attacks brought on by the fear that Ward would be unable to find 
a toilet if needed - claims that Ward has “brought her nervous negative energy under control” 
and “learned how to use it for good” (Logan 2015, my italics). Logan underlines an important 
issue: the extent to which vulnerability is equated with socially undesirable characteristics such 
as ‘neediness’, an over-burdensome way of being in the world which is not ‘good’. Logan’s brief 
critique of Ward’s persona suggests that the success of What If There is No Toilet? is due, in part, 
to Ward having ‘tamed’ her anxiety. The show, with its narrative thread of recovery, has outed 
the panic attacks that were once hidden: it has made them material as well as persona. Or put 
another way, the show has made Ward’s anxiety more bearable to Logan because ‘it’ has been 
explained. Thus, Logan is ambiguously both celebrating Ward’s vulnerability and setting the 
‘proper’ parameters of how it should be deployed. There is a potential gender bias in such 
criticism. As Ward says:  
I think something that has been tricky for British reviewers to swallow with me is I’m not 
a damaged genius. So sometimes when I do a joke that doesn’t quite get the reaction I 
want, I say, guys you can clap louder than that, that was very funny. That’s … faux-
arrogance. But other comedians who attack the audience as part of their schtick: they are 
lorded as being unique. There’s definitely sexism that comes into play. Rose Matafeo [New 
Zealand comic] and I talk about how women are perceived, how anxiety is perceived. ‘Oh, 
she’s very anxious on stage, she’s got an anxious persona, an anxious personality’. And 
Rose says, they’re writing it like it’s a bad thing! We have anxiety: of course we’re anxious! 
Many comics come across as depressed, often men are depressed as part of their persona. 
Or Russell Kane: he’s very hyper; and he’s been hugely successful. When he was first 
exploding [onto the scene] it was this refreshing, energetic, hyper-active young man. With 
women, it’s like: ‘Oh, she’s a bit anxious’. (Ward 2019) 
In addition to the way that certain readings of female artists reveal gender bias, I argue that the 
analysis of Ward’s persona can lead to more generative readings of vulnerability as a vital 
aesthetic resource which extends the range of what is possible in stand-up comedy.  At one 
point in What If There is No Toilet? Ward tells the story of a panic attack she experiences on her 
birthday. Because she is so distraught, her boyfriend makes the decision to physically restrain 
her. This is one instance, perhaps, where one’s sympathy for Ward threatens to overwhelm her 
comedy. However, this moment of extreme vulnerability is undercut in two ways. First, Ward 
deploys a vivid metaphor to describe her physical state:  
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I started flailing around … I looked like one of those blow up men out the front of used car 
dealerships. I’m like N…No! [begins to physicalise the image arms and body waving as she is 
speaking but smiling at the same time] These prices are crazy! Everything must go! 
Nothing to do with diarrhoea, just quality Toyota Camries. [big laugh from audience] 
(Ward 2016) 
This moment jolts the spectator away from the emotional content and toward a more distanced 
perspective. The comedy arises from the absurd juxtaposition of the lived reality with the 
metaphorical extension; one that feels oddly apt. A balloon man, after all, has nothing inside 
him. He is a hollow skin filled with air, he is nothing but the ‘behaviour’ of his image, which is 
weightless, chaotic movement. The comedy enriches the metaphor by enacting and physically 
demonstrating it. It also points to a rather obvious fact about comedy: that it always pushes 
toward weightlessness. As Kant put it, laughter creates a “sudden evaporation of expectation to 
nothing”, a disappearance of something into the void of laughter (qtd in Critchley 2002, p. 5). In 
her personification of anxiety as a blow-up man, Ward attains a kind of weightlessness that, 
however briefly, allows her and her audience to transcend the memory of a trauma, to turn it 
into material. Far from the unbearable vulnerability of being, for Ward this is the bearable 
lightness of being Ward. The balloon image works so well, both as poetry and comedy, because 
it represents a complete lack of subjectivity in a highly subjective moment.v  
Secondly, Ward undercuts the vulnerability of the moment by stating, matter-of-factly: 
“After a while I think I just tuckered myself out!” This is followed by a nod and a wink to the 
audience: 
It’s very tiring being mentally ill, let me tell you. [Changes persona into a workout 
instructor with a faux upper-class English accent] And that’s why I’m in such great shape 
[poses, legs stretched in profile, as the instructor, as if for camera]. (Ward 2016) 
This impish knowingness is a major part of Ward’s persona, Brechtian in its estrangement of 
material and mood: the exuberant depressive, able to share harrowing personal detail with the 
breezy flamboyance of a Butlin’s redcoat. This is not to suggest that Ward’s smile is somehow 
fake, the rictus grin of the bored entertainer. Far from it, Ward’s originality lies in her ability to 
match high level performance energy with searing distress, without ever appearing shamed or 
in need of sympathy. Ward enjoys performing. In her own words, “performance is an act of 
service” (Ward 2019). It is such moments of Verfremdungseffekt that forcefully remind us of 
performance’s contribution to a poetics of vulnerability: that in heightened states of mood and 
attention, performance can disrupt the binary that falsely separates the normative good - 
socially positive behaviour - from so-called mental illness (bad). For the time of her 
performance, Ward suspends the judgement that requires some people to be labelled mad and 
others sane.   
PERSONA AS BELONGING: SEYMOUR MACE’S REVELS IN DEPRESSION 
The fifth and final category is that of persona as a way of belonging in the world, of creating and 
maintaining a useful social role. Seymour Mace is a Newcastle-based comedian who enjoys a 
cult following due to his long-standing work as a headliner on the club circuit and his award-
winning Edinburgh fringe shows, such as Niche as Fuck (2015); Shit Title (2016); and Seymour 
Mace is My Name: Climb up My Nose and Sit in my Brain (2019). Difficult to categorise, Mace’s 
work regularly includes material about depression: “I’ve been spending a lot of time by myself. 
I’ve been doing that thing where you don’t wash your hair… Depression.” As Mace stated in 
interview:   
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It’s easy to see how ridiculous the world is. We wear clothes, build houses, but we’re just 
animals like all the other animals. Everything is ridiculous. It’s easy to view that 
negatively. The world is crazy. I see depression as a switch. Because my switch is switched 
to negative, I only see the negatives. (Mace 2019a) 
Mace rarely allows the audience to settle into a cosy relationship with him or the material.  
There is something edgy about his work: he is not asking you to build a relationship with him. 
He is not asking for permission. He uses his voice and body boldly: this is me. Take or leave it 
but I will make you laugh. Often his observations are delivered in a conversational drawl, 
frequented by pauses, doubtful err’s and ah’s. The comedy is heightened by the way polished 
material is scuffed and broken up by the slowness of delivery. The literal transcription of the 
above joke would be:  
So err, right, I’ve err I’ve been spending a lot of time by myself… been doing that thing 
where you don’t wash your hair… Depression.  
Perhaps of all the comics whose persona I analyse here Mace is the one who presents the least 
concern for what the audience thinks of him. This is not the ‘faux arrogance’ that Ward and Lee 
utilise to great effect. With Mace, unlike Ward and Lee, one is rarely conscious of another self, 
peeking through the façade. Mace’s on-stage self is closer to a kind of ontological ground zero: a 
purified deprecated self, which acts as a foundation from which all else follows. His uniqueness 
lies in the juxtaposition of a depressed, despairing, often angry perspective on the world – its 
injustice, its need for conformity – with flights of childlike fancy and a love of home-made 
theatrical props. This conjunction has led to his work being described as “dark whimsy”, which 
Mace has further dubbed “Grimsy” (see Goldsmith 2016). 
A normative reading (or performing) of vulnerability would single out Mace as ‘the 
vulnerable one’ because he is speaking of suffering, different in essence from the autonomous, 
invulnerable spectators. Such a reading would be wholly in keeping with normative 
assumptions that seek to close down a nuanced engagement with vulnerability.   Stand-up 
circumvents this paradigm in several ways. The most obvious way this happens is that 
comedians have the microphone, and thus take control of the room. As Mace puts it:  
There’s a definite separation between the persona on stage and the persona off stage. A 
lot of people don’t get that, they expect you to be that person they just saw on stage. For 
many people, their worst nightmare is doing what I do, getting on stage in front of people 
but for me it’s the opposite way round: the stage is the one place where I feel comfortable 
where I can be 100% myself. I can be a complete arsehole and its perfectly alright for 
people to laugh at me. If I did this kind of thing out on the street I would be sectioned. It 
would be inappropriate to form a crowd and laugh at me. For me on stage is only place 
where I feel sane. I feel at one. When I get off stage that’s the insane place. I have to wear 
blinkers, I have to fit in with society, become a happy little robot … I’d happily be on stage 
all the time. (Seminar 2019a) 
Echoing both Robin Williams’ and Lauren Pattison’s comments, what is remarkable is how much 
of this off-stage conversation – recorded in a public seminar – found its way into Mace’s 2019 
show Climb Up My Nose, almost verbatim. These words elicited much laughter in an Edinburgh 
fringe preview, suggesting that the line between the on-stage and off-stage persona is not quite 
as clear-cut as Mace suggests. I do not know whether the off-stage conversation was a ‘bit’ 
before the seminar, or whether Mace logged it in his mind and decided to use it for the show at a 
later stage. I do not think that this matters; my point is not to ‘test’ the origin or authenticity of a 
thought. The point is the fluidity between life lived and life as material. For Mace, and perhaps 
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for many comics, there is no distinct line. It is as though Mace is continually inhabiting a 
potential stage, where personal revelation operates as material and vice versa. In his full-length 
fringe shows – and in his monthly panel show Seymour Makes it up As He Goes Along – Mace 
turns on the house-lights and often eschews use of a microphone. The gap between on- and off-
stage is therefore traversed and the informality heightened. In his 2019 show Mace follows the 
above monologue with a literal illustration of the gap between his on- and off-stage self. 
Standing off-stage, he stands head down, to the music of Tom Waits, the sombre piano 
underscoring the slow lyrics: “Lonely, Lonely, Lonely I, Lonely place”. Leaping on stage, the 
music cuts to Uptown Funk by Mark Ronson and Bruno Mars: “Come on, dance, jump on it / If 
you sexy then flaunt it / If you freaky then own it”. The demonstration becomes funnier the 
more the juxtaposition is repeated and the swifter the changes between each persona. With 
depressive panache, in the performance I viewed, Mace made a point of berating his own 
performance for its lack of finesse and pointing out all the ways it should be improved. This 
generated more laughter.  
Any sense of ‘recovery’ in Mace’s case in not visible or voiced. He exists on-stage in a 
comic present, any recovery always offset to some future point, some moment where his 
apartness from the world may end. Indeed, as his most recent Fringe show attests, he had to 
abandon his working title, Seymour Beats Depression, because he could not beat it (Mace 2019b). 
Mace’s depression becomes material, alongside other material. This is counter to a normative 
societal pressure for disability or mental illness to carry a weight of meaning: a warning for 
others; or a cathartic message to take forward about overcoming tragedy; or an exemplar of the 
contemporary watchword – resilience. Mace’s depression, in other words, is not redemptive. 
During one scratch pub gig in 2017, Mace created a montage of personal humiliation (a ritual 
shaming by his ‘parents’, drawn from members of the audience; and indecision as to the 
practical means of a potential suicide, performed to the soundtrack of Pharrell Williams’s 
Happy, which offered few obvious punchlines). Such comedy depends on an unusual complicity. 
Mace invited several spectators to join him on stage, to play members of his family. We were 
given a script. While we briefly rehearsed the lines, Mace stripped down to his underwear. 
There followed what might be described as a ritual shaming, with each family member taking 
turns to inform Mace what an inadequate human being he was and that he was not really a 
member of the family. The majority of the audience met this event with hysterical laughter – 
although one did leave in tears. Mace’s humour, I argue, slips the knot of Hannah Gadsby’s 
Nanette moment because the self-deprecation is so extreme, so foundational to him as a person: 
it becomes a commentary on deprecation itself and the lengths an audience will go to support a 
performer. Mace himself is resistant to the idea that his depression is a muse that fuels his 
comedy, but for me, a delighted spectator, I am not sure. It is as though I am witnessing 
someone seeking to understand who they are in the world, only able to find themselves, 
momentarily, through performance. Mace takes something that he finds chronically debilitating 
in real life and turns it into something beautiful on stage. During Shit Title (2016) he states: “I 
suffer from depression. Well no, I don’t suffer from it. I revel in it!” So (mostly) does the 
audience. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay has demonstrated five ways in which persona can be understood in relation to stand-
up and mental health and has focused on the surface presentation of self (persona) rather than 
the depth of underlying desires (psyche). This focus mirrors both the form of the joke, which 
deliberately shatters distinctions between surface and depth, and the form of modern 
psychiatry, which turns surface symptoms into diagnostic labels and thus eschews subjective 
depth (see Leader 2011, pp. 31-33). Subjectivity, as Darian Leader has argued, is currently 
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missing from clinical responses to mental illness. This is proven by the fact that in a single year 
(2008) only 0.17 per cent of published medical papers about schizophrenia referenced patients’ 
direct experience (Geekie & Read 2009, p. 25). To treat distress as a problem of pharmacology – 
a set of symptoms, an object to be treated, a pill to be swallowed – denies the essential human 
stories that create a person and enable them to connect with others. Stand-up provides a direct 
channel to these stories and gives permission for other stories to be heard.   
In this essay I am suggesting new theoretical perspectives in the emerging field of 
performance and mental health. I am offering the field a poetics of vulnerability. Such a poetics 
suggests that that vulnerability is a comedic resource to be used and celebrated: that 
vulnerability invites spectators’ complicity; that it re-avows concepts of support and care; and 
that it places both fixed identity and fixed judgement in doubt. Stand-up is an art form well 
suited to ‘therapeutic subjectivity’ – the projection of an inner self that needs to be witnessed 
and understood by others. This operates in resistance to ‘entrepreneurial subjectivity’ that 
promotes competitive self-seeking as the only rational choice and which makes the individual 
consumer solely responsible for his or her own health.  
A poetics of vulnerability also supports the concept that performance and mental health 
is a gendered subject: performance mirrors the cultural tendency for male artists’ distress to be 
“reframed as [being] indicative of essentially male attributes of creativity, uniqueness” (Bell 
2011, p. 203) whereas the “hysterical body has become emblematic of all the traditionally 
negative characteristics considered to be feminine: duplicity, theatricality, suggestibility, 
instability, weakness, passivity and excessive emotionality” (Bankey 2001, p. 40). The comic 
form does however render this category ambiguous. The artists discussed here engage in an art 
form that utilises all the negative ‘feminine’ characteristics, identified by Bankey, as constitutive 
of its craft: duplicity (Scott’s misdirection and double meaning); theatricality (Ward’s 
exaggerated personification); suggestibility (Lee’s outrageous maintenance of false truth in the 
service of the joke); weakness (Pattison’s revelation of vulnerability as a mode of self-
deprecation); passivity (Ward’s faux-arrogance of not ‘caring’ what an audience thinks); and 
excessive emotionality (Mace’s ‘manic’ rants).   
A poetics of vulnerability has room for both acceptance and critique of official diagnostic 
labels. Ward reports that she is diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder and emerging 
depression; Scott, at the point of writing, is content with his fought-for diagnosis of bipolar; and 
Mace expresses the relief that accompanied his diagnosis of depression (Goldsmith 2016). At no 
point, aside from Lee’s routine which acts as a meta-commentary on stand-up and depression, is 
there an indication of the problem of labelling per se. Does this indicate that the absence of 
diagnostic categories has become unthinkable? Rather it suggests that by wearing the label – by 
absorbing it into the persona as it were – the diagnosis itself has become a kind of shield from a 
vulnerability that would otherwise be too painful to share. One of the issues that Scott faced 
when publicising his show was the sudden fact of having the words bipolar and schizophrenia 
next to his name. Scott had to adjust to the reality that his public persona was now inflected 
with new labels and over time he became comfortable with them (Seminar 2019a). This is a 
considerable contribution to a growing culture of de-stigmatising and ‘un-shaming’ of 
psychiatric labels.  
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END NOTES 
i It is no accident that the joke teller often begins the set with a reference to their own physical 
attributes.  The laugh comes from the recognition that they see what you see; that they are 
somehow standing outside themselves seeing themselves as you do: that is why “I know what 
you’re thinking…” is a common set up line. 
ii This also demonstrates Ince’s care for his fan base, many of whom will see him repeatedly, 
year after year (Ince 2018b). For Stewart Lee, the same applies in a slightly different way: “One 
of the reasons I always man the book stall afterwards is I find it very funny to do all that edgy 
stuff for two hours and then be all, ‘Hello, how are you? Would you like this signed, too?’” (Self 
2016). 
iii The portrait that Apatow paints of himself as the artist as a young geek is instructive as a 
model or ‘ideal type’: he is “an angry kid” for whom the world does “not make sense”; and so 
turns to comedians to “fill the void” (2015, pp. xii-xiii).    
iv For detailed examinations of comedy and mental health by practicing comedians see Robin 
Ince’s documentary Tears of a Clown, BBC Radio 4 and Susan Calman’s Cheer Up Love: 
Adventures in Depression with the Crab of Hate. 
v It also tangentially acts as a comment on a cultural narrative in which female performers are 
emptied of subjectivity (see Gregory 2018, pp. 1-2). 
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